Wireless interface network security assessment
Electronic systems may be equipped with multiple wireless interfaces, such as Wi-Fi and radio interfaces, to allow the exchange of different kinds of data with the outside. The agricultural sector increasingly relies on automated vehicles. These machines are often based on a CANbus control network and equipped with different wireless interfaces to implement different functionalities, such as remote control through radio links, GPS-based localization, and Wi-Fi-based data exchange. In some cases, these interfaces are directly connected with the system’s internal data bus which is also linked to other vital parts of the system, such as, in case of vehicles, the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) [WIN1]. In this way, the remote execution of malicious code sent via wireless remote-control interfaces may be critical for the all system [WIN2] [WIN3]. The assessment of the system security against attacks carried on through wireless interfaces is of primary importance, depends not only on the considered wireless communication technology but also on the system structure, and may be performed through different methods [WIN4]. The method consists in a framework for evaluating the network security of agricultural vehicles, in particular CANbus Security and Network Segmentation, Remote control based on Radio-Links, Wireless Gateways, and GPS security. Taking as input the architecture of the control network, the framework evaluates the vulnerabilities focusing on the analysis of attack models, verifying if they allow directly accessing portions of the control network, estimating the impact on the network.
- Many critical threats and hazards can be thoroughly investigated
- Ease of result exploitation compared to advanced penetration testing strategies
- Possible application in a large set of scenarios to investigate a wide set of possible attacks
- Allow schematization of common vulnerabilities in wireless interfaces, such as radio link and Wi-Fi interfaces
- The applicability may be affected by the frequency bands and the usually proprietary protocols used for the radio link communications and by the internal data bus network segmentation [GAPM-WIN01].
- The achievable accuracy may depend on different factors, including the power of the received signal and the received signal to noise ratio [GAPM-WIN02].
- It may require heavy human intervention, especially in the initial “tuning” phase when the different tested attacks need to be adapted to the attacked system [GAPM-WIN03].
- The application in a real (TRL6-7) environment may not be straightforward. Further effort is required to integrate the method in a ready-to-use tool [GAPM-WIN04].
[WIN1] Miller C., Valasek C., "A survey of remote automotive attack surfaces", black hat USA 2014, whitepaper, 2014.
[WIN2] Miller C., Valasek C., "Adventures in automotive networks and control units", Def Con 21 whitepaper, 2013.
[WIN3] Pan L., Zheng X., Chen, H. X., Luan T., Bootwala H., Batten L., "Cyber security attacks to modern vehicular systems", Journal of Information Security and Applications, volume 36, pages 90-100, 2017.
[WIN4] "The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)", https://owasp.org/