Model-Implemented Attack Injection

In this method, the attacks (which are special types of faults) are injected in the model of the system under test (SUT). MATLAB and LabVIEW are examples of tools used to build such system models. This method is used to verify and validate the system’s capability to handle attacks. The attack handling includes mechanisms to detect and prevent intrusions. This type of attack injection method is used for the system’s evaluation in the early design stages.
Model-Implemented Attack Injection (MIAI) is defined as a technique where attack injection mechanisms implemented as model blocks are injected into simulated target system models. The purpose of MIAI is to evaluate the impact of cybersecurity attacks on target systems at early development phases, e.g., to evaluate the cybersecurity characteristics and mechanisms implemented in the system.

Attacks can be defined as human made, intentional malicious activity to effect hardware or software from external system boundaries during the operational phase of a system [MIA1].

MIAI is a model-based test and verification framework which enables to test and evaluate the impact of cybersecurity threats by injecting attack models into the target system model at early design and development phases [MIA3].

The MIAI methodology supports the use of cybersecurity attack models capable of jamming, replay, denial of service and intercept, etc. [MIA2] [MIA3] [MIA4].

  • MIAI is aligned with the shift-left approach [MIA5] where the focus of the test and verification activities are shifted towards the early design and development process to find and improve the weaknesses of the software as much as possible and as early as possible with less effort and resources.
  • MIAI is used for testing and verification of the cybersecurity of the simulated model of the intended software. This gives an early evaluation of the software behaviour under the presence of attacks.
  • MIAI gives valuable input to the design allowing the development engineers to get a holistic view of the cybersecurity bottlenecks.
  • MIAI can be used to evaluate the intrusion detection and handling mechanisms as well as system behaviour under the presence of attacks.
  • Measurements from MIAI may be useful in later V&V.
  • The MIAI is limited to the attack injection on the simulation level (simulation-based attack injection) and it is not possible to inject attacks into actual physical target systems. There are other techniques used to inject attacks on physical level such as vulnerability attack injection.
  • Accuracy of the attack models with respect to the actual attacks in the physical system may not be adequate.
  • Any change in the system design in the later stages of the product development cycle might decrease the usefulness of the measurements from the attack model and cannot be used for the comparison of the results between verification and validation stages.
  • [MIA1] B. Sangchoolie, P. Folkesson, and J. Vinter, “A study of the interplay between safety and security using model-implemented fault injection,” in 2018 14th Eur. Dep. Comp. Conf. (EDCC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 41–48.
  • [MIA2] B. Sangchoolie, P. Folkesson, Pierre Kleberger and J. Vinter, “Analysis of Cybersecurity Mechanisms with respect to Dependability and Security Attributes,” in 2020 50th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops.
  • [MIA3] P. Folkesson, B. Sangchoolie, and J. Vinter, “HoliSec D3.3 - Interplay between Safety, Security and Privacy.” The HoliSec Consortium, Mar. 19, 2019.
  • [MIA4] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2007/09/11/stride-chart/
  • [MIA5] Bjerke-Gulstuen K., Larsen E.W., Stålhane T., Dingsøyr T. (2015) High Level Test Driven Development – Shift Left. In: Lassenius C., Dingsøyr T., Paasivaara M. (eds) Agile Processes in Software Engineering and Extreme Programming. XP 2015. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 212. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18612-2_23
Method Dimensions
In-the-lab environment
Experimental - Simulation
Model
Detail Design
Thinking, Acting, Sensing
Non-Functional - Security
V&V process criteria, SCP criteria
Relations
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